State-local tax policies to encourage growth and development have been roundly criticized as detrimental to social welfare. In response, recent proposals have included delimiting the ability of states and localities to fashion tax policies. Not only are such proposals unworkable, but they fail to harness the creative energy and ideas of development practitioners as they act competitively to foster growth and development. Accordingly, we propose an alternative basis on which to fashion state-local taxation of business, that is, the so-called benefit principle which aligns business taxes with costs of government services received by business entities.
Discussion of the relation between regional growth and taxation has grown increasingly contentious over the past 30 to 40 years. The reasons for this are quite evident. First, the statelocal government sector and business taxes have grown in importance.
1 More importantly, statelocal tax policies and tax systems have come to be crafted with an eye toward regional growth and development. Specifically, states and localities have adopted and customized selective tax incentives as policy tools to attract the attention of would-be investors, even while states have increasingly sought to fine-tune their "tax climates" to be conducive to growth and investment.
Most notably, as high-paying manufacturing jobs have dispersed across regions-especially from the Northeast and Midwest to the South and West-the strategic use of tax incentives and structural changes to the tax system have accompanied the shifts in investment geography.
The practice of fashioning tax policy toward the goals of growth and development has been roundly criticized by social scientists as costly and inefficient. With regard to the location of industry itself, it is argued that tax-induced industrial location decisions tend to lower national welfare by moving business investments away from otherwise-preferred locations. For example, tax competition distorts business decisions, resulting in fish-processing plants far from waterways and aircraft maintenance facilities far from locations most suited by climate. In addition, tax competition itself is characterized as a negative-sum game with respect to financing public goods. That is, local governments and firms themselves cannot refrain from tax competition; yet, in doing so, revenues become insufficient to support intermediate goods (such as public education) that are crucial to productivity, welfare, and growth. Thus, corrective policies have been proposed. At the most applied level, Burstein and Rolnick (1995) have suggested that the federal government circumscribe and penalize those firms that receive selective tax and public-service abatements.
Yet the arguments of policy analysts on this issue have been far from one-sided. Some analysts contend that subnational tax policies may be quite helpful in "clearing" stubbornly underemployed local labor markets (Bartik, 1991 and Gramlich, 1997) . And, from a practical standpoint of tax and legal administration, restrictions and penalties on state and local customization of tax liabilities have been dismissed as unworkable, inasmuch as central government regulation of state-local tax practices for development may be difficult to implement and enforce in our federal system. In particular, selective subsidies to firms on the service/spending side could serve the same purpose as selective tax abatements, thereby avoiding the intent of regulation. Another concern is that de facto selective tax abatements can be easily written directly into general tax codes. This may include a general tax code provision exempting a firm of a minimum size, in a specific industry, or in a specified location from tax liability, which is tantamount to selective abatement. All of these regulatory impracticalities lead us to search for an organization of fiscal affairs in which economic development and tax-policy practitioners can follow their competitive instincts and creative energies toward outcomes that maximize community wealth and well-being.
2
The benefit principle approach to general business taxation offers resolution of these contentious issues, much as user fees for highways and business license fees for regulatory services are used today. Elsewhere, we have argued that the confusion and controversy surrounding the proper approach to state-local general business taxation arises from a failure to consider "first principles" of how business should be taxed (Oakland and Testa, 1996) . First-on the grounds of fairness to individuals, with respect to their ability to pay-the current basis for business taxation as a way to "get at the rich" should be abandoned, because the actual incidence of business taxes remains unknown and is likely far less regressive than popularly imagined. A long and broad set of theoretical models and statistical investigations of tax incidence has been
developed; yet such issues as the timing and degree of tax shifting away from owners of business and capital owners to laborers and consumers, remain elusive.
3
Meanwhile, in considering neutrality and efficiency, a benefit principle approach to general business taxation is far superior. The benefit principle prescribes that services rendered by government to business entities should be financed by a proportionate tax system. This tax system mimics a "user charge" system of financing those services that the state-local sector provides to business. Indeed, such user fees, along with impact fees imposed by municipal governments upon certain types of development, have grown more prevalent in recent decades.
Such fees are fashioned to manage commercial and residential expansion, so that the right prices for indirect services provided or induced are paid for explicitly and made a part of the developers' or businesses' expansion decisions. 4 In doing so, an implicit price for services consumed is charged, so that such user fees induce businesses to consume public services in appropriate amounts while aptly compensating governments for their costs of provision. But user fees and direct charges are not always practical. The non-excludability feature for such public services as general access roadway use and business/tourism promotion is a case in point. For general services that are not amenable to direct fees for services rendered, a business tax structured in proportion to benefits received is a next-best alternative approach. 5 Through this approach, business taxes become locationally neutral with respect to where businesses are most productive, rather than having location decisions whipsawed by capricious tax incentives.
With regard to business services provided by government under a benefit principle approach, decision-making of the electorate will be improved, because households are likely to accede to government provision of business services insofar as business is recognized as paying its own way. As an example of this effect, so-called business improvement districts (BIDs) are being authorized and created in the urban areas of many states. Such districts are typically initiated by business-oriented neighorhoods that wish to tax themselves more heavily in exchange for greater public-service levels-levels that would not otherwise be forthcoming from the general electorate (Houston, 1997; Boston Municipal Reference Bureau 1998) . 6 In such districts, government acts as the auditor and banker of a quasi-governmental entity that chooses to tax itself more highly. Businesses thereby gain, both from greater service levels and from the ability to customize services to meet local desires. This is no small matter, insofar as public services to business such as transportation infrastructure, police, and fire are (inconsistently)
found to significantly induce growth and development. Overall, if tax competition is ruinous or seems the folly of politically motivated elected officials under the current set of tax arrangements, competition becomes value-creating under the benefit principle. Operating under a benefit principle, regions and their development practitioners can continue to practice vigorously-but they should and would do so by providing the correct level and mix of public services to business at a fair and least-cost price. Indeed, much as in the case of BIDS and, at the state level, certain public-private councils (such as those in Indiana and Wisconsin), recognition that the benefit principle is operable will encourage a better dialogue between the business community and government concerning the level and mix of public services. 8 Having an alternative way to compete for investment, elected officials who pursue growth and development may thereby choose to curtail the use of selective abatements, which are so objectionable to policy analysts.
The propensities to award selective tax abatements would be discouraged for yet another reason. On average, the current array of business taxes imposes far higher taxes on business entities than do the services received, with a ratio of at least two dollars paid for every dollar of public service expenditures references (and as we will demonstrate, further on in this article).
Given these large differences, it is little wonder that selective abatements, such as property tax abatements and tax-increment financing districts, are awarded almost automatically rather than with discretion. As a benefit principle benchmark became a more prominent vehicle to encourage and regulate business activity, the demonstration of need for selective abatements to encourage development would become more rigorous.
It should also to be noted that improved public decision-making is not confined to the services provided to the business sector and to the use of selective abatements. In making decisions about household public services, the voting population and their representatives are now less likely to misread the true costs of public services. Such is the case whereby voters misperceive that "business" is paying for household services, such as parks, recreation, and to some degree, education-when, in fact, business taxation is a mere conduit for hidden tax shifting back onto households themselves. 9 Owing to high mobility of business capital and the many markets to which sellers have access, the opportunities for tax exporting are generally much fewer than those touted by elected officials. This latter consideration is important in answering those who contend that moving toward benefit principle (i.e., marginal valuation pricing) of business services will hamper the ability of state-local governments to redistribute income from high-income to low-income households. As with other household services, income redistribution cannot be a free or subsidized tie-in of business development; it must be evaluated and provided by households in their roles as citizens.
How Do We Now Measure Up to the Benefit Principle?
How do we get there from here? The first step is to know the general direction in which we must go-especially so, because the political feasibility of major changes to tax structures are few and far between. Accordingly, it is necessary to evaluate incremental fiscal changes and proposals as they come up, to determine whether they move us toward the goal of a more rational business tax and expenditure framework.
Existing studies of how closely governments approximate the benefit principle in practice are consistent in showing that business taxes exceed the costs of services by significant
proportions. At the local government level, Kitchen and Slack's (1993) examination of municipalities in Ontario shows that the nonresidential payments of taxes exceed the nonresidential share of expenditures by ratios of over two. This result will not surprise those familiar with the literature concerning the fiscal impacts of business property on local communities in the United States where one general result is that property and other local taxes paid by businesses exceed business services rendered by an average ratio of three (Buschell and Listoken, 1993) . Such findings are echoed at the state government level; William Oakland's 1988 study of Louisiana state government general-fund spending for fiscal 1986 finds that business revenues exceeded the costs of services received by 29%.
Our approach here, to measuring this ratio of business taxes paid to costs of services provided, is to combine state with local government finances in each of seven Midwest states:
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. In making interstate comparisons, combining state and local government is the only valid approach, because service delivery responsibilities between the two differ from state to state, as do tax sources and intergovernmental grant flows. The methodology for estimating business taxes and business expenditures of state and local governments follows that of Oakland and Testa (1996) , which produced estimates for the states of the Seventh Federal Reserve District for fiscal 1992.
Estimation of the costs of business services is more uncertain than estimation of business tax revenues. Appendix A displays the estimated results and assumptions behind "business expenditure costs" for the Midwest region.) Although we cannot accurately allocate publicservice costs between the business and household sectors for many types of spending, we have taken pains to err on the side of allocating generous shares of benefits of each spending category to the business sector. We do this as an exercise, to illustrate the directions toward improvement in existing policy. In actual practice of benefit-principle taxation, a more active dialogue between business and government would help reveal accurate business demands for services.
As a matter of procedure in comparing business-related government expenditures with business taxes, we must first net out those costs (for each spending category) financed by user fees, direct charges for services, and federal grants-in-aid. The remainder is an estimate of taxfinanced expenditures (See Appendix Table A ). These expenditures are allocated to one of two sectors: household or business. Expenditures that accrue exclusively to households include education, welfare, other transfer payments, and parks and recreation. Such services account for the bulk of tax-financed public services. Few service categories-e.g., water transport and natural resources-accrue exclusively to business. Some services, such as police and fire or corrections, are split evenly between household and business by assumption, even though it is doubtful that the business sector can derive as much service benefit as do households. Some remaining "overhead and unallocable" categories, such as legislative, interest on debt, and public buildings, are prorated in proportion to the aforementioned overall allocation between business and household. These estimates comprise overall expenditures that can be compared against business taxes (Appendix Table B ). Business taxes are those that, in the assumed absence of shifting, would reduce a business' bottom line-taxes on its property, purchases of inputs, income, or right to exist. Property taxes are by far the largest source of such revenue.
We can view estimates of business taxes and business service costs in terms of how existing state tax structures relate and compare to each other and to conceptual benchmarks-specifically, to the benefit principle. One way to measure the deviation of each state's fiscal system from the benefit principle of taxation is to examine the ratio of business taxes to the tax-financed costs of services rendered to the business community (Table 1) . For fiscal year 1995, a ratio of 2.42 of taxes to cost of benefits can be seen for the Midwest region, defined here as Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. The range among these states is striking, with a ratio of 3.30 in Indiana to a low of 1.89 for Wisconsin.
[ Table 1 here]
Caution should be exercised in interpreting these ratios as indicators of the net costs or deficiencies in "tax climate" to business arising from a state's fiscal system. First, our procedures for assigning government services to the business sector is imprecise. Moreover, there is no assurance that such services are equally effective in all states. Second, the ratios are averages for the business community as a whole; the situation for individual firms could vary widely. For these reasons, the ratios shown in the table should more properly be viewed as measures of the relative fiscal climate confronting a representative firm among the Midwestern states. Given the uncertainty about the effectiveness and measurement of government services to business, even this interpretation is subject to error; therefore, it may prove be inappropriate to place significance on modest differences in ratios.
What Would a Single Business Tax Look Like in the Midwest?
What would a general business tax system look like, in contrast to the hodgepodge of business taxes that exists? We propose that a broad measure of "business activity" should be the tax base of choice for a general business tax. It is business activity that gives rise to government services-not business profits or income. So too, among the alternative candidates for indicators of business activity, value added (and not gross receipts) is more indicative of such business activity, because it avoids cascading or double counting of activity. Geographically, value added as the tax base should be computed on an origin basis-because, almost universally, it is business activity within a state (i.e., origin basis) rather than outside that gives rise to state and local government services. 10 To its further credit, such a tax base is neutral with respect to a firm's choice of input proportions-that is, its use of capital versus labor or land in production.
By contrast, most existing business taxes fall disproportionately on capital-intensive firms-for example, corporate net income taxes, sales taxes as applied to business machinery and equipment, and local property taxes.
In Table 2 , business tax collections in each state are expressed as a share of gross state product-the latter being closely akin (if not identical) to value added. 11 Here we see that, if we treat all business tax sources combined as a hypothetical single business tax, the rate of such a tax would average 4.5% in the Midwest. These are the estimates at current levels of business taxation-that is, combining into one revenue source today's numerous individual taxes levied against business property, purchases, assets, and right to do business-and assuming that the state-local government sector collects revenue from a single business tax equal to actual collections from all business taxes during fiscal 1995.
[ Table 2 here]
In comparison to existing general business taxes, such a hypothetical single business tax on value added would be very broad-based, much like Michigan's "single business tax," which is imposed by state government there (Barlow and Connor, 1982; ACIR, 1978) . The broad basis of such a tax would also have the salutary effect of extending to the growing service sector of the economy.
12 By contrast, the basis of taxation for the most prominent state-level business tax, the state corporate income tax, is narrow and has been narrowing further. Business income taxes usually apply only to those firms organized under the corporate legal structure and, in addition, are often skewed in tax liability toward very large corporations. Moreover, the corporate income tax base coverage is being further confined to those corporations which sell to the state from outside, as states are re-structuring their corporate taxes in the 1990s.
While a hypothetical single business tax on value added by origin has the desirable characteristics of being broad-based and set at a low rate, the rates would be lower still if revenue collections were lowered to levels consistent with costs of business services currently received.
As measured, the rates of taxation under this scenario fall to an average of 1.9% of value added for fiscal 1995 (Table 2) , with rates ranging from 1.3 in Indiana to 2.4 in Wisconsin.
Again, a perspective is needed to properly interpret these hypothetical differences.
Differing rates may reflect differing preferences by business entities for public services, and therefore need not reflect any particular state's tax-climate advantage or disadvantage. Indeed, this variation is a desired feature of a business tax system based on the benefit principle.
Specifically, fiscally shaped business development policy will be channeled toward differences in public service type and levels across states. Over time, we would expect that the business service levels and tax rates would change as a benefits-based scheme was enacted. Businesses could be expected to respond to a changing tax system by changing requests for public services, as an active dialogue emerged between business and public-sector service providers.
One final measure of deviation from the benefit principle can be considered in the interstate competitive context. The final column of Table 2 reflects the difference in hypothetical tax rates between a single business tax, raising revenues at current levels, and the tax rate that would apply under a benefit principle. Across states, the distribution and interstate differences change as compared to the measure of overall tax rates expressed in column 1. A single state's business tax rate may be somewhat high, such as Wisconsin's; yet, under a benefit consideration, services provided in a given state may compensate for revenues collected.
Conclusions
All too often, tax structures emerge without much thoughtful planning and design. No doubt, this occurs over many decades under the immediate pressures of revenue demands, administrative feasibility, and political expediency. In the case of state-local business taxation, such evolution has given rise to much confusion with regard to optimal tax policy. For example, current debates over the efficacy of selective tax abatements to lure new investment appear nowhere near consensus, and longstanding business taxes (such as state corporate net income taxes) continue to be revised and amended without a clear understanding of how business entities ought to be taxed. In both these instances, the overarching goal, as publicly stated, appears to be the promotion of regional growth and development. Yet, in thinking over the strongest foundation on which to construct a system of business taxation, it is clear that the benefit principle would be a substantial improvement over the current array of state-local business taxes.
The benefit principle prescribes that general business taxes be refashioned to align with the costs of services provided by the state-local government sector to business entities. This allows a 14 healthy competition among regions to provide the correct level and mix of services to business at maximum cost-effectiveness. It also allows state and local governments, with the approval of the local electorate, to reach out-of-state businesses and charge them for services rendered. At the same time, it does not distort the "prices" the local household sector should view and use in evaluating and articulating their own preferences for services from state and local government. If followed, such system of business taxation can only promote growth and welfare.
In practical application, insofar as the governmental sector provides services to a wide array of business, business taxes themselves should be broad-based and closely correlated with the extent of each business' activity. We have suggested that the basis of such taxation should be something closely akin to the value-added activity of each business within a state's boundaries.
Such a system implies that all general costs of services to business entities in Midwest states might be financed by a tax rate varying from 2% to 3% of annual business activity.
Appendix Methodology for Business Taxes and Expenditures
Expenditures:
(See Appendix Table A) Expenditures by function are reported annually by the Governments Division of the U.S. Other categories of spending are allocated directly to business or to the household sector.
Taxes:
(See Appendix Table B He has shared unpublished estimates of these shares, using 1993 tax structures. We have applied these shares to general sales tax collections to arrive at our estimates of the general sales tax paid by business. Taxes on broad-based inputs to production: We exclude selective taxes, such as those levied on tobacco, alcohol, and amusement. Presumably, these are intended to be shifted forward to consumers.
Likewise, taxes on specific industries, such as motel/hotel or severance taxes, are not broad-based business taxes but are intended to discourage or compensate for damages imposed on the state or local community. By contrast, we do include the following (1962) and was adopted for analyses of state-local taxes by Mieszkowski (1972) and McClure (1978) .
Empirical work conducted since that time has done little to determine the ultimate incidence of taxes such as the state corporate income tax and local property taxes on business property. Depending on the mobility of capital and labor across locations and upon elasticities of substitution among products (and their industries), as well as upon shares of factors in production, taxes imposed on business entities may be shifted backward onto factors of production or forward onto consumers to various degrees.
4. For a review of the broad range of the structure of impact fees and exactions, their places of application, and their purposes, see Einsweiler and Miness (1992) . Impact fees on manufacturing also reveal fiscal impacts and service costs; Snyder and Stegman ( 1986) propose a road impact cost of a 50,000-square-foot manufacturing facility should be $24,300.
5. Not all costs and impacts of business location are related to business services. For example, environmental disutility is not service-related as such, nor do such impacts necessarily give rise to government service provision in such instances as general unsightliness or noise. William Fischel and others have hypothesized that the exercise of restrictive land use controls by local governments allows communities to derive compensation for such environmental impact through the payment of surplus property taxes by businesses which, in turn, may be used by the community to fund household services such as schooling (Fischel, 1975) . If such a mechanism is operable, it may be compatible with a benefit principle approach to business taxation because residents are implicitly revealing their values of environment and public schools by controlling business entry. In other instances where business expansion gives rise to ancillary activity and its attendant public services, general business taxation fashioned as a user charge or under the benefit principle may or may not be a first best means of regulation and pricing. For example, business location may give rise to population influx, with attendant costs of public services such as schools and parks. Is a local business tax optimal as a means of marginal value pricing in this case? A better alternative may be to have households pay their own way for services.
If impacted households are also wage earners of local businesses, the costs of household services will be reflected in the wages needed to compensate, attract, and retain workers in the community. The added advantage of the latter is that, in paying for their public services directly, households will choose wisely and monitor the level, mix, and efficiency of those services, such as schooling, in which they are most interested. Moreover, in many cases it is difficult to discern whether jobs give rise to population, or population gives rise to jobs. This difficulty, coupled with an ill-conceived "impact tax", could easily become the source of a significant errors in economic development policy.
6. As an example, enabling legislation in Illinois has been in place since 1973, and the city of Chicago currently has 16 such districts in place.
7. The inclusion of services produced by state and local government for business is thought to be crucial in fashioning statistical appraisals of the impacts of fiscal affairs on growth and development. For a comprehensive review and appraisal of the relevant empirical work, see Ronald C. Fisher (1997) . For a review of the statistical literature on both property taxes and local public policies on industrial location, see Bartik (1991) . For a review of the "survey of firms" approach for local site selection criteria, see Calzonetti and Walker (1991) . The vast number of studies have come no closer to pin-pointing marginal values of public business service spending by category. This is most likely because quality is not measured well by dollars, and because service levels and configurations matter differently to different businesses in differing locales.
8. In some states, councils and commissions are set in place to advise the legislature on business development policies including tax structure and expenditure mix, along with other programs and policies; in Indiana, a permanent organization has been in place since the early 1980s. The Indiana Economic Development Council serves this role, as did the Wisconsin Strategic Development Council and Expenditure Commission in that state during the 1980s and early 1990s.
9. A benefit-principle approach to general business taxation in no way precludes those specific taxes on the rents of out-of-state residents-such as severance taxes, for example.
10. Some analysts argue that, by providing the foundations for a market, the government provides a valuable benefit to firms who choose to sell in their jurisdiction, including those firms who produce outside its boundaries but sell within them. Although there is some validity to this argument, the costs of government services to business arise much more from production activities than from selling activities.
Moreover, to the extent that selling activities give rise to value added, foreign-based firms will become subject to the origin-based value-added tax in appropriate measure.
11. Such value added can be measured as the difference between a firm's sales and its purchase of materials and capital inputs (i.e., the subtraction method), or it can be measured by adding payments to inputs-wages, profits, rents, and interest (i.e., adding-up method). Because multistate and multinational firms could manipulate intrafirm sales prices to reduce tax liability (transfer pricing), the "adding-up" approach may be the more practical. To avoid the problems of transfer pricing, this means that capital earnings (interest and profits) of multijurisdictional firms will have to be apportioned, just as they are under the present state corporate income taxes; however, the present practice of assigning disproportionate weight to the sales factor is inconsistent with the origin approach, as discussed below.
12. Stemming from legal proceedings, the narrow base of New Hampshire's Business Profits Tax was an impetus behind that state's adoption of a modest value-added tax (Daphne 1996). 
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